The affluenza argument also connects directly to religious values. Lives spent valuing acquisition of material possessions presumably value less the intangible, the spiritual, and the self-sacrificing. The documentary Affluenza already has pointed out that battling affluenza politically unites a political left-wing concerned with protecting the environment with a political right-wing seeing affluenza as a distraction from a Godcentered life (deGraaf, Boe, and Simon, 1997) .
Typically mass media are asserted to be principal actors in spreading affluenza.
Though it might be easy to dismiss affluenza as a cutesy "pop culture" catch phrase, the argument actually presents a serious matter with testable claims. This research project examines the affluenza argument that media use (especially TV viewing) connects to affluenza values and presumed affluenza symptoms, and further this link is so strong and pervasive it appears even among religious populations, especially religious youth.
Along the way this research should help our understanding of three important, if somewhat overlapping, concerns: 1) whether affluenza should be viewed as a message Religious Groups & "Affluenza": Further Exploration of the TV-Materialism Link, p. 3 effects model, an exercise in audience uses and gratifications, or a reinforcing cycle combining both; 2) whether affluenza effects validate cultural critiques of consumerism as an object-oriented opiate of the masses, and 3) how consumerist messages implicitly devalue citizenship, effectively bolstering the status quo.
Literature Review
Man's economic and spiritual connection to his material creations, even before electronic media's capacity to multiply that connection, long has been a subject of introspection and dispute. As Georg Simmel (1911) has written, "Man, unlike the animals, does not allow himself simply to be absorbed by the naturally given order of the world. Instead, he tears himself loose from it, places himself in opposition to it, making demands of it, overpowering it, then overpowered by it" (p. 27).
In Simmel's construction those primarily directed toward salvation and the soul share one trait with those primarily directed toward satisfaction through goods. Both miss the importance of culture as an integrating factor of subject and object (p. 36).
Industrial production, he notes, generates products for which there is no need. "Thus vast supplies of products come into existence which call for an artificial demand that is senseless from the perspective of the subjects' culture" (p. 43). Mass Media, especially mass advertising, help generate and maintain that artificial demand.
Simmel further observes that "infinitely growing supply of objectified spirit places" not only creates desires, but also feelings of individual inadequacy and Religious Groups & "Affluenza": Further Exploration of the TV-Materialism Link, p. 4 helplessness. Man becomes surrounded by things that are neither meaningless nor meaningful. His possessions, in effect, own him (p. 44):
This could be characterized with the exact reversal of the words that refer to the first Franciscan monks in their spiritual poverty, their absolute freedom from all things which wanted to divert the path of their souls:
Nihil habentes, omnia possidentes (those who have nothing own everything). Instead man has become richer and more overloaded:
Cultures omnia habentes, nihil possidentes (cultures which have everything own nothing).
One scarcely could come up with a better definition of what, in modern parlance, is called affluenza. Marcuse (1964) also lamented that advanced industrial cultures create an imperative for goods. "The means of mass transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging, food, and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional reactions which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers, and through the latter, to the whole." Indoctrination to the value of goods moves from publicity to a way of life, one-dimensional thought and behavior almost immune to change (p. 12).
Marcuse and his cultural critiques, of course, played a large role in what came to be known as the Frankfurt School's critical theory (Jay, 1973) . One extrapolation by Farr (2009), for example, argued that the value of human beings is being reduced to the labels Religious Groups & "Affluenza": Further Exploration of the TV-Materialism Link, p. 5 on our shirts; human relationships are mediated by material possessions (p. 52). He further argues that the wishes of ghetto youth for expensive brand-name clothing are a logical result of "dehumanizing materialism of capitalist society." We are unified, rich and poor, by mass media in a false equality in which the terms of the relationship and the overarching message are unchallenged (pp. 87-88).
One also could call Thorstein Veblen's The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) as an intellectual forerunner of concern for the societal consequences of consumerist or materialist values. To describe how the wealthy use material goods to signal status he coined the expression "conspicuous consumption." The idea certainly tracks through Packard's The Status Seekers (1959) and Galbraith's The Affluent Society (1958) .
More recently Barber (2007) picked up the affluenza argument, noting that marketing has expanded so rapidly that it has replaced religiously-derived values such as saving, deferred gratification, humility, obligation, and community orientation with spending, instant gratification, and self-centered, personal entitlement. The Protestant work ethic in the U.S. now is better expressed as shop to excess without hesitation or guilt; it is only an external manifestation of your great qualities that lead to your economic success.
Past studies have sought to quantify the links in the affluenza argument. Harmon Values surveys, face-to-face interviews in 69 societies in 50 countries for a total of more than 60,000 respondents. Those who watch less TV (fewer than two hours daily) were more likely to select "a society in which ideas count more than money" in a list of societal goals. Other given options were: a stable economy, progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society, and the fight against crime. Heavy TV viewers (more than two hours daily) were less likely to report being happy, more likely to say they are financially dissatisfied and dissatisfied with life overall. They also were more likely to say that it was important to teach children about thrift, money, savings, and things.
These findings complement Kasser's (2002) summary of conclusions about materialist personalities. Materialists tend to be possessive, preferring to own and keep things rather than rent, borrow, or discard. They envy the possessions of others, and are non-generous in that they do not share with others. Materialists crave social recognition, and link image and popularity to possessions. They also report being less happy overall and less satisfied with their finances. Burroughs & Rindfleisch (2002) drew upon values theory to declare materialism antithetical to well being. They argued that it is the individual orientation of materialism, standing in sharp contrast to the collective-oriented values of family and religion, that creates psychological tension and reduced sense of well being. This explanation fits well their study of 120 college students and their survey of 373 adults, all in the U.S. The explanation also works well with a study of U. S. and Singapore respondents (Swinyard, Religious Groups & "Affluenza": Further Exploration of the TV-Materialism Link, p. 7 Kau & Phua, 2001 ) that found happiness negatively related to materialism, but positively related to intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity.
The theoretical basis of the media-materialism link draws from a different tradition. The theoretical underpinning, sometimes implied and sometimes explicit, draws from George Gerbner's view (Potter, 1993; Signorelli & Morgan, 1990 ) that television is the central cultural arm of society. The centrality means TV has disproportional audience effects in terms of subtle, pervasive adoption of the worldview presented by TV. This Gerbner called a "cultivation" effect, and suggested TV's violence cultivated among heavy viewers a notion of the world as a mean and dangerous place (Gerbner & Jhally, 1994; Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-Beeck, Jeffries-Fox, & Signorielli, 1978) .
The affluenza modification is that Gerbner chose the wrong central message.
Violence is just a convenient and economically transportable dramatic device-a punch in the nose is the same in German, Japanese, or Arabic. The more ubiquitous TV message is "buy stuff." The commercials not only scream it, they also create narratives of products making one more attractive, desirable, successful, current, and other characteristics thought of as "cool." The programming also has a disproportionate share of wealthy people using expensive goods, wearing fashionable clothes, and living glamorous lives (Rushkoff, Dretzin & Goodman, 2003) .
A competing model stresses uses and gratifications. Advocates for this approach disdain the search for TV message effects on audience members. Instead, they asset the link runs the other direction. Audiences are not passive sponges, sitting around soaking up memes and messages. They bring their own needs, wants, worldviews, Religious Groups & "Affluenza": Further Exploration of the TV-Materialism Link, p. 8 predispositions, and individual experiences to the viewing experience. Thus, shallow and superficial persons simply seek more TV, or fill unplanned hours with it, because it fits their needs, their wants, and their outlook.
This research likely will not settle the long-standing rift between effects and gratifications approaches, but it can explore which has more explanatory value in this instance. Further, this work can offer greater insight into this small but growing area of inquiry-in this case by testing the general claims of affluenza (linking TV hours with materialistic values) among the last subgroups one might suspect would be prey to it, namely those tied to various faith traditions.
Methods
The databases used in these secondary analyses were downloaded as Statistical Package for the Social Sciences portable files from the Association of Religion Data Archives, www.thearda.com. The researcher used keyword searches ("tv hours," "television," and "television hours") to identify questions and surveys that had the examined media variable. The researcher then examined the codebooks of these surveys for any variable bearing on materialistic values of claimed "affluenza" symptoms such as unhappiness, financial worry, possession envy, stress, or debt.
These procedures yielded the six surveys analyzed. The Mennonite Church member profile (Kauffman and Harder, 1989 ) was a 28-page questionnaire administered in a group setting to five Mennonite denominations in the U.S. and Canada, March to July 1989. All 181 conference affiliated congregations were in the potential sample, though the probability of selection was proportional to the number of members; 153 Religious Groups & "Affluenza": Further Exploration of the TV-Materialism Link, p. 9 congregations agreed to participate. Members within those congregations were selected randomly to fill out the questionnaire, and 3,083 did so.
The Mennonite profile conveniently created a materialism scale comprised of six questions, each prefaced "For each item in the left column, circle the number of the answer column that indicates how important the item is in your own life and thought":
• Earning as much money as possible
• Being dressed in the latest styles and fashions
• Earning enough money to be secure in my old age
• Working hard so as to get ahead financially
• Saving as much money as possible
• Getting the nicest home and furnishings I can afford.
An additional shallow value "Making myself as beautiful or handsome possible" was available and analyzed separately. This research will be called Study One
Mennonites.
The 1997 survey of U.S. followers of Soka Gakkai, a Japanese-based form of Buddhism, drew from a previous survey of British followers of the same religion. The survey questionnaire replicated many questions from the National Opinion Research Center's U.S. General Social Survey. The sample was drawn randomly from subscribers to any of four SGI-USA magazines, and then stratified to reflect the regional distribution of SGI-USA members. The final response rate was 37%, a total of 401 respondents (Hammond, 1997) . This research will be called Study Two Buddhists. completed at Hispanic "youth society meetings" of the North American division (Canada, U.S., Bermuda) of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. The congregations were selected by a randomization technique that accounted for congregation size by using a list from largest to smallest, and another list from smallest to largest. The researchers used a random starting point and an interval guaranteeing a sample of 60 congregations. A total of 1,163 respondents at those meetings, youth and adult, completed surveys (Hernandez, et al, 1994) . This research will be called Study Three Adventists.
The Effective Christian Education survey (Benson, 1991) The final survey, collected in October and November 1989, analyzed the beliefs and moral values of U. S. children. Thought not specifically geared to one or more religious denominations, it did include an over-sample of students in parochial and private schools (often for religious reasons) and thus was added to this analysis. The sampling began with a list of 110,000 schools. These were stratified into cells based on size and type of school, region, and size of municipality. A randomization technique within each cell led to the selected 5,012 students who completed surveys administered by a teacher in a classroom setting. Some 59% of these children were in elementary school, 24% in middle school, and 17% in senior high. Among these students 72% were in public schools, 14% in parochial, and 13% in private school, overrepresentations of the latter two. This research will be called Survey Six Child Morality.
Results
Across the six surveys comprising this secondary analysis heavier television viewing generally correlated with "affluenza" attitudes among these diverse religious communities. A linear regression using the Study One Mennonites showed greatest disagreement with materialist attitudes among the lightest viewers, and greatest agreement with materialist attitudes among the heaviest viewers. The same relationship Religious Groups & "Affluenza": Further Exploration of the TV-Materialism Link, p. 12 held true for heavier TV viewing (and going to the movies) and valuing one's personal beauty. The researcher also tested usage of other media and affluenza attitudes. Radio listening, watching videos, going to movies, and curiously reading newspapers also correlated with affluenza statements. Reading books correlated with rejecting affluenza statements and with rejecting personal beauty as an important value (Table 1) .
Study Two Buddhists demonstrated only modest connections between TV
viewing and materialistic attitudes. Heavy TV viewers were more likely than light viewers to say it is important to have nice things, and important to be financially secure.
Light viewers were more likely than heavy ones to agree with the statement that happiness cannot be achieved through things external to the self, though all these differences fell short of statistical significance. Further, TV viewing was not predictive, on statements related to buying on credit, the desirability of accumulating wealth, or progress toward a society where ideas matter more than money.
On only one question yielded a statistically significant finding in the expected affluenza direction. Those who said less emphasis on material possessions would be a bad thing were indeed heavier viewers (mean 3.92 daily TV hours) than those who said it would be a good thing (mean 1.82 daily TV hours). Those who said "it depends" fell in between at 2.25 daily TV hours (Table 2) The students also were asked which goal will be most important to them as they face the future. Those selecting the materialist options "Becoming a famous or important person" (N=355) or "Being able to make a lot of money" (N=560) watched 3.14 and 3.16 hours respectively, roughly a half-hour a day more viewing than those who chose: getting married and having a good family life, helping others in need, having a close relationship with God, having a close set of friends you can count on, and having meaningful and challenging work.
The pattern generally reversed for the goals rated least. Those who disdained "being able to make a lot of money" or "becoming a famous or important person" by rating it least watched about a half-hour less TV than those rating any of the other options least important. Further support for the affluenza hypothesis comes from the 1,371 who projected "you can make a lot of money" as the most important reason for choosing a future job. Those students watched a mean 3.14 daily TV hours, again roughly half an hour a day more than those choosing other reasons such as: fun and exciting, helps other people, personally satisfying, or God's will. One must caution that correlation is not causality. It is possible these conditions arose independently, or that some missing third variable leads to both heavy TV viewing and affluenza values. So how should one interpret the low-level but rather consistent connection between amount of TV viewing and affluenza values even among religious communities?
One could argue for an effects model, namely that heavy TV viewing inculcates materialist values and thus leads to related symptoms. However, one also could look at these findings through the prism of audience uses and gratifications. Those persons already financially worried simply drift toward TV as a cheap and easy form of diversion, companionship, or killing time. This parsimonious linking of affluenza values to audience needs and habits best fits both the results of this study and the bulk of past work.
Nevertheless, a nuanced and promising approach is to look at these results as documenting one stage in a reinforcing cycle or spiral. Television often presents us with a shiny, fast-paced narrative in which the central figures often are wealthier and thinner than those attracted to the programming. The programs are interrupted with more direct commercials, often stating that the solution to some personal problem is through material goods. When reality fails to live up to this narrative, some viewers get upset not at the message or the medium but at the reality. These viewers thus escape to TV fantasies for yet another cycle of materialism messages. Data about what was being watched, of course, would be necessary to confirm this claim.
This point, however, fits well the lament of Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes and Sasson (1992) about how the social construction of reality works for many viewers. "The overwhelming Religious Groups & "Affluenza": Further Exploration of the TV-Materialism Link, p. 16 conclusion," they wrote, "is that the media generally operate in ways that promote apathy, cynicism, and quiescence rather than active citizenship and participation." The consistent lies of mediated messages (buy stuff to be happy, you are what you acquire) not only disappoint but also set up future disappointment. Further, the cynical and apolitical message overlay reinforces existing power arrangements by deflecting any public impulse toward challenging the status quo.
This mediated social construction operates the way Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1984) described as a spiral of silence. She argued most people do not feel comfortable proclaiming ideas not validated by mediated repetition. They choose not to speak the message, and thus others do not hear it, leading to a downward spiral in which non-validated ideas are "swallowed." One also could argue that this social construction of reality supports the Marcuse lamentation about "the "technical apparatus of production and destruction which sustains and improves the life of the individuals while subordinating them to the masters of the apparatus" (p. TV Usage question: "On the average week, about how many hours do you watch TV?" Scale: 1 = Don't watch TV, 2 = Less than 1 hour a week, 3 = between 1 and 2 hours a week, 4 = between 3 and 4 hours a week, 5 = between 5 and 6 hours a week, 6 = 7 hours or more.
(Young Adolescent) How much do you want the following? --To have lots of money.
Mean TV score N Std. Dev. Video Game Usage scaled: 1 = 0 hours, 2 = 1-2 hours, 3 = 3-5 hours, 4 = 6-10 hours, 5 = 11+ hours.
